Trade unions in britain today by john mcilroy auto

Official records of strikes in the UK have been kept since and record numerous ups and downs, periods of calm and sudden upsurges. Seen in this perspective, the last 20 years are exceptional.

Never before has a low-strike period lasted so long. A key turning point was reached in the early s. In every year since the number of strikes has been lower than the number of strikes in any year prior to The article begins by presenting some essential facts and figures and then discusses recent explanations for the present level of strikes—in particular, the view that the low level of strikes is caused by a low level of confidence among workers.

It will be argued that the confidence theory of strikes has serious weaknesses. The article will then present an account of the decline of strikes in the s and will use this as the basis for an alternative understanding of the present situation.

In particular, one crucial aspect has changed since the s: This key development has important implications for the way workplace trade unionism has subsequently developed, and is the main explanation for the stability of the current low level of strikes in the UK.

Finally, the article will look at some general implications of the present situation for socialists. It should be noted at the outset that this article is not intended as an overall assessment of the present balance of class forces, nor of the current state of political and class consciousness within the working class: The explanation of how we got to the present situation is not simple—and the solutions will not be simple either.

Most advanced industrial economies experienced a reduction in strikes during the s, but it continued longer and further in the UK. In the s these indicators were all at historically high levels, and fell dramatically in the s—Table 1 shows the scale of the decline. The number of strikes fell further in , to a historic low of 92, but have since recovered slightly.

The big spike in recent strike figures was , with two very large public sector strikes on 30 June and 30 November, henceforth J30 and N In total strikes were only slightly up, at , but strike days totalled 1,, There were similar spikes in , and , most of which represent large-scale public sector strikes. In strikes averaged each year, with , strike days—a return to previous levels. The pattern of strikes before included large numbers of this type of strike, which were commonly associated with shop steward bargaining at the workplace.

According to one estimate, 7 the number of strikes in manufacturing was in reality four times the official figures, so the actual decline has probably been even greater than the figures indicate. Figures for strike days are generally more reliable because they are dominated by a small number of large strikes and are therefore easier to calculate.

Between and just 64 strikes accounted for 46 percent of all strike days. Despite problems with the figures, the long-term pattern is clear. All three indicators of strike activity were very high in the s. In the first half of the s the number of strikes fell sharply while strike days remained high. This means that strikes on average became longer, reflecting the bitterness of disputes in the period.

Strikes continued to fall in the late s, and strike days also fell dramatically, as did the number of workers involved. By the early s a new pattern had emerged, with historically very low levels of strike activity on all measures.

Since the early s all measures of strikes have been very low, and quite small increases in strike activity can produce disproportionate spikes in the figures. Within the pages of this journal two explanations for the low level of strikes have been proposed. However, Neil offers little supporting evidence for this analysis beyond a complaint from a novelist about house prices, 15 and he cites no industrial relations research. If the cause of the low level of strikes is to be found in the structure of capitalism under neoliberalism, how are workers to overcome such obstacles?

The second explanation, more prominent in this journal, is that the level of strikes is low because the confidence of the working class is low. As workers do recover confidence, though, so will the level of strikes increase.

However, there are a number of problems with this account too. To begin with, in historical perspective, the relationship between confidence and strikes is not at all straightforward.

There are many examples of strikes that arose not from confidence but from desperation. Moreover, a high level of confidence on the part of striking workers is not always a strength. Problems arising from sectional confidence and over-confidence could be seen in many bitter disputes of the s and s.

That is, if the level of strikes is low because confidence is low, then why is the level of confidence low? In particular, if rising working class confidence has not been able to overcome the trade union bureaucracy up to now, how might it do so in future? But the underlying weakness of the confidence theory of strikes is that it fails to examine precisely how confidence might turn into strikes. But this is a serious oversimplification of a complex process.

A similar debate took place within academic industrial relations during the s. For Brown, declining collectivism explained declining collective action during the s. This analysis was subjected to two main lines of criticism. First, it was pointed out that there was in fact little evidence of declining collectivism among workers—and this continues to be the case. Second, and more importantly for the current discussion, John Kelly 24 showed convincingly that it was a mistake to assume that collectivist ideas and collective grievances would automatically lead to collective action.

In reality, a number of important processes lie between a sense of grievance and any eventual industrial action. Thus, in a workplace context, dissatisfaction must be perceived as an injustice ; the injustice must be seen as a collective issue; the cause of the collective injustice must be attributed to the employer; workers must make a calculation about their chances of success with any proposed industrial action, and must decide that the benefits outweigh the possible costs; and workers must have sufficient organisation to make the action a reality.

In all these processes the role of workplace leaders—such as socialist militants—is often crucial. And, if there are problems in any one of these processes, including a lack of leadership, the result is likely to be that an underlying grievance will not lead to collective action.

The key conclusion that follows from this analysis is that the lack of collective action cannot be taken as evidence of a lack of collective sentiment among workers.

Nor is it difficult for socialists who are active in trade unions to think of many concrete difficulties that can and do arise in mobilising workers to take industrial action. A similar logic can be applied to the relationship between confidence and strikes.

It only takes a moment or two of reflection to appreciate that there are serious problems with assuming that such a path exists. In reality, many obstacles might arise to prevent the expression of confidence in the form of strikes. How significant are these developments? When considering this question, the theoretical framework that is applied makes a difference.

Unfortunately, the confidence theory of strikes has led commentators in this journal, on a number of occasions, incorrectly to predict a revival of strike action. Nevertheless, many statements are clear enough.

A massive protest next year could electrify the trade union movement and become the launch pad for militant action. What is happening is quite clear. The generalised anti-capitalist mood…is pulling up the mood of resistance in much wider layers of the class.

This in turn is beginning to erode the mood of defeat in the unions, thus affecting their numbers and willingness to take action. This process was already observable in small ways during the early s…but it has become more pronounced in the last year…[and might] spill over into a decisive struggle on the industrial front.

The growing radicalisation taking place in the trade union movement… things appear to be speeding up… In many cases they displayed a new confidence… The number of strikes seems to be multiplying. Similar views were expressed in the s. Seen from today, this view is clearly mistaken. The benefits of hindsight are well known, but persistent miscalculations regarding the likely development of the industrial struggle suggest a need for theoretical reappraisal.

These articles share a common approach. The analysis starts by identifying modest signs of recovery in working class confidence and combativity, and then moves on to suggest that reviving confidence could be expressed in further industrial action, leading to a general upsurge. It is not my intention to cite exhaustive quotes on this point. Perhaps the authors will dispute my interpretation and remind readers that these articles include warnings that nothing is certain, that the trade union bureaucracy might retain control, and so on.

Or perhaps, despite those caveats, they will agree that the general analysis in these articles is clear: While it is important for Marxists to retain an appreciation of the possibilities inherent in any historical situation, the most important service we can provide for the labour movement is not to highlight what might happen, but to develop an understanding of what is most likely to happen. That helps socialist activists and militant workers to orientate correctly upon the class struggle.

The confidence theory of strikes has proved problematic in this regard. It cannot account for the continuing low level of struggle over the last 20 years, and it has incorrectly predicted breakthroughs that did not occur. For this reason, we need to develop an alternative theory that can understand why signs of recovering confidence have not led to a breakthrough.

But when trying to understand the course of the class struggle, confidence is only one part of the picture. The following section will look at wider reasons for the decline of strikes during the s. Understanding those reasons is important for explaining both why there are so few strikes in Britain today, and why this situation is likely to continue.

According to one version of the downturn analysis, the main reason for the decline of industrial action from the mids was that a layer of shop stewards had become bureaucratised.

The problem with this argument is that the rise of full-time stewards does not coincide with wider developments in the industrial struggle. Although there certainly were instances where full-time stewards acted to undermine strikes, it is far from clear that the reason they did so was because they had found a cushy life away from the shop floor.

In fact, early statements of the downturn analysis mention many other factors besides the spread of full-time stewards. During the s, however, the unions and the level of strikes were massively impacted by three key developments that could not have been foreseen when Cliff developed his original insight, and which had a far greater effect in reducing the level of strikes.

The following sections will discuss these issues. The long post-war boom led to a generation of full employment, which was an essential underpinning of union militancy prior to Full employment radically shifted the balance of bargaining power in the workplace in favour of workers. In industries like engineering, full employment helped to turn payment by results piecework —which had originally been introduced by employers as a way of screwing down wages—into a mechanism for boosting pay.

Young engineering workers would move from one factory to another, following the best rates of pay as employers bid against each other to attract workers. In these circumstances, in a number of industries, shop stewards pursued vigorous workplace bargaining using unofficial strikes as their main weapon, driving a growing strike wave throughout the s, which exploded into the s. However, the return of serious and sustained recession from the mids undermined this militancy, and in the s the situation worsened dramatically.

It is important to understand the pattern of strikes in the UK before , which was highly concentrated in a few sectors. According to one reputable commentator, just 4 percent of union members contributed 53 percent of strikes. In the early s manufacturing suffered massive recession, and from the late s the coal industry underwent wholesale destruction. Thus economic restructuring simply removed a very significant source of strikes in the UK.

The s recession also accelerated the long-term shift in UK employment away from manufacturing towards the private service sector, which is poorly unionised. The decline of union membership since is itself a significant factor reducing strikes, because strike action is almost always action by unionised workers. By , union density in the private sector was a little over 14 percent, 47 and union membership roughly half its level.

Economic restructuring has been an important factor in the decline of union membership as unionised industries and workplaces have closed and new enterprises have not become unionised. Metals, engineering, shipbuilding, vehicles 1, 42 Other manufacturing 98 19 Transport, communications and distribution 65 Construction 57 24 12 3.

Coal 6 1. Public services 21 75 98 80 Total 2, 2, 2, 1, Within manufacturing the average size of establishment has greatly reduced, so those private sector strikes that do occur tend to be smaller.

Since the public and private sectors have had roughly the same number of strikes, but the public sector has accounted for around 80 percent of days lost because bargaining units are larger. A peak in saw the public sector account for 96 percent of all strike days.

The impact of economic restructuring helped to break the habit of striking in other ways. Employers can and do use this argument as a scare tactic, and there are many examples of unions giving in unnecessarily. But the real problem with the viability argument is that it is true: Economic restructuring also shaped the pattern of strikes that emerged in the s. Some industries are less exposed to international competition. These include public services, such as health, education, civil service and local government.

Here strikes increased during the s as union organisation strengthened and workers with greater job security grew more willing to take industrial action. These two sectors account for most recent stoppages Tables 2 and 3. Another important influence on strikes is pressure on wages. This was reduced in the s as inflation fell. Furthermore, redundancies in the s were often accompanied by productivity gains and pay rises for those workers remaining in employment.

Indeed, for most of the s wages rose faster than inflation. More recently the combination of slightly higher inflation and austerity-driven wage freezes has led to renewed pressure on wages, but union leaderships have been able to contain pressure from members over pay. How this process might have played out if inflation had been at s levels can only be guessed at.

But it does seem likely that generally lower inflation has some influence on current strike levels. Since the late 19th century unions taking strike action while engaged in a lawful trade dispute have had immunity from claims for damages.

In and secondary picketing was banned and secondary action severely restricted. In the requirement to ballot before official industrial action was introduced it was further complicated in This inhibited the main way strikes started, ie among ordinary members, sometimes being made official later. The next year strikes at the company collapsed almost to zero. Although the law was only used in a minority of disputes, individual unions repeatedly found themselves in legal difficulties.

Between and unions were subject to legal actions. Unions were hit with damages and, more significantly, injunctions. Given the generally feeble submission before the law of union leaders today, it comes as quite a surprise to recall that there was initially considerable defiance of the new laws—hence the large number of court cases. But by the later s unions started to comply. Injunctions led to action being called off and disputes collapsed as a result.

In industries with a highly mobile workforce, such as construction, this is almost impossible. Union mergers, of which there have been many in recent years, are known to disorganise membership records. Unions that ballot regularly, like the RMT, develop much more accurate membership lists, though even here successful legal challenges are possible.

Balloting laws that were supposedly introduced to ensure union democracy have increasingly been used to prevent strike action, even when supported by a majority of union members. Further restrictions seem likely, given the current clamour in Tory circles. Finally, the s also saw changes to the criminal law which made the conduct of strikes more difficult for unions. Crucially, the new laws pressed unions to police their own members. Gradually union leaders sought to keep themselves out of court by gaining control over strike action.

The hugely damaging and demoralising defeats of powerful unions in the s are probably familiar to readers of this journal and will not be dealt with in detail. From the mids employers started to dismiss strikers. Between and dismissal of strikers was used at least 45 times and threatened 38 times.

Other sanctions have included loss of redundancy pay. Unsurprisingly, workers lost the confidence to strike without the backing of the union, further reducing unofficial strikes 79 even before they were legally restricted.

Official strikes are now the great majority, which has implications for the pattern of stoppages see below. The defeats also had effects on union officials. In the s, in key sectors of industry, strikes were a commonly used method for dealing with workplace grievances or demands. What can safely be said…is that the character of British strikes is firmly embedded in traditions of workplace organisation…and it will take a major upheaval to destroy the practice of solving disputes at the point of production and the pattern of short workplace-based action that goes with it.

Of course, a major upheaval did take place and the old practices were largely destroyed. The question, then, is what new habits emerged to take their place? These reforms set the broad framework for union-employer relations, including: The framework was further reinforced during the Second World War.

After union activists also used the new found bargaining power offered by full employment further to strengthen workplace organisation, to build shop steward organisation in many industries and to fight hard at workplace level for better pay and conditions. Legal and institutional changes went alongside economic crisis, renewed employer hostility and state policy that turned against previous engagement with unions. Although workplace activists might object to the suggestion that union activity was ever very safe nevertheless the wider point is surely correct.

Unions now face hostility on all sides. When Labour repealed the IR Act in its then minority government was thwarted in the attempt to widen the scope of secondary action, but it succeeded in So an employer who sacked all workers taking part in a strike would not face unfair dismissal claims, which could only happen if strikers were dismissed selectively.

The anti-strike stance of the Labour leaderships during the s, evident during the years of the Wilson government of , became cemented during the final years of the Callaghan government of This strike-averse mentality was transmitted into the perspectives and practical orientations of trade unions themselves, to varying degrees, over the course of the s. But he does not explain why Labour was any more anti-strike in the s than it had been during His one example is the Grunwick strike, The Labour government… reeling under the impact of public sector strikes , sought to prove to the British establishment that they could do what Heath [Tory prime minister —74] had been unable to do: To this end, with the connivance of the TUC under the leadership of Len Murray, both secondary action and mass picketing in support of the Grunwick strikers were forcefully suppressed.

The key events at Grunwick, in June and July , included four weeks of daily mass picketing, during which arrests were made, and 44 days of unofficial postal boycott of Grunwick mail at Cricklewood sorting office. The Act removed immunity from most secondary sympathy or solidarity action and strikes other than over terms and conditions eg political strikes.

Secondary picketing, at other than your own workplace, even if under the same employer, lost immunity. The restriction to six pickets has remained since in a code of practice. It also relaxed the criteria for avoiding unfair dismissal claims by allowing some selectivity in the dismissal of strikers and selective re-engagement, after three months, of dismissed strikers. Workplace ballots for official strikes were introduced in with action taken within four weeks to retain immunity; these were replaced by postal ballots, with onerous notice requirements, in not mentioned by Mark.

So, instead, employers go to a High Court judge for a court order, known as an interim injunction interdict in Scotland , to prohibit a strike until a full hearing in court. The decision whether to grant an interim injunction is based on legal rules heavily weighted against unions. One complaint has been the use sometimes of the ex parte without notice injunction, where the union is not even aware of the court hearing. Generally the injunction stops the strike. So many conditions apply to the principle of immunity that the risks of being in breach of them and so bringing the danger of significant damages being exacted by employers, are high.

In this situation all trade union leaders are extremely cautious about any type of action that might run out of their control and will avoid strike action wherever they can. The Act legislated on unofficial strikes. Unofficial strikers can be dismissed, all of them or selectively, without redress. This must also state: Finally, unofficial strike leaders have sometimes been served with injunctions.

A later review noted: Labour promised repeal of the and Acts in its election manifesto. The joint statement also proposed widening rights to picket and prohibiting ex parte injunctions. Although the TUC was calling for enhanced individual employment rights by the late s this was not at the expense of collective rights, as Mark suggests.

Ballots before strikes and for union elections will stay. This dispute led, at the Labour conference, to support for secondary action. Trade and industry secretary Alan Johnson retorted: Labour saw the strike question as mainly settled and was silent on it in the election manifestos of , , and My view is that the most strike-prone industries in the s and s coalmining, motor vehicles, shipbuilding and the docks were all subject to radical product-market restructuring in the s, involving massive job loss and major changes in working practices.

His account of the strike, written in but not published until , is revealing: Long unsuccessful strikes at Peugeot factories in Coventry and at Vauxhall Ellesmere Port in autumn gave managers the opportunity to enforce their will on the return to work. A partial strike escalated when the TGWU made it official. The company threatened to dismiss all 18, strikers and withhold back pay, bonus and redundancy money.

The TGWU recommended a return but no unions signed the new conditions document. In management threats to liquidate parts of the same company and dismiss all strikers without redundancy money led to a pay strike of 46, workers being abandoned. Employers took advantage of the deep economic recession.

The total unemployed rose from 1. Extensive plant closures and job losses in the early s were accompanied by widespread short-time working and a halving of overtime, reflecting a collapse of product markets.

Any possible legislative effects from the and Acts on strike numbers were swamped by economic factors. Dates of implementation of strike legislation: The NCB won an early injunction against secondary picketing of other miners which resulted in increased picketing and a large demonstration when the injunction was served.

The NCB industrial relations director cautioned against pursuing the legal action, amid fears it would solidify resistance, and it was dropped. The government turned to mass policing and the criminal law. The great London dock strike of had been the most public sign of the rise of unskilled labour. In its centenary year there was the haunting symbolism of the return of casual labour, union de-recognition or emasculation in many ports, and dismissal of all the Tilbury shop stewards.

A week later, it began contempt proceedings but dropped these on 19 November except against two unions. By then half the workforce had returned; the rout was complete two days later. As significant was its effect on the shop floor. In the first nine months of at the Cowley assembly plant there had been unofficial stoppages many too small or short for inclusion in government figures.

Workers were now warned that they would be instantly dismissed if they took unofficial action. Across the company in only 0. Coal industry strikes in and returned to the level of the early s. But in a new discipline code, with draconian penalties, provoked two wide-scale stoppages and unofficial pickets were threatened with dismissal.

Elsewhere the threat to withhold redundancy pay in rundowns or closures of workplaces was a potent factor in stopping resistance. One source counted 45 instances and 38 threats in three years from mid Through the s and s some 95 percent of recorded strikes were unofficial out of an annual average of 2, ; there were, for example, an average official strikes each year during Even after September , when the law required ballots usually at the workplace for official strikes, unofficial stoppages sometimes featured in the build up to official action.

For example, they accompanied pay negotiations at Ford from November In January the Ford unions held mass meetings immediately prior to workplace ballots common in well-organised workplaces ; another unofficial walkout then preceded the official strike in February. Justifying legislation on unofficial strikes, the government also gave the example of a provincial newspaper dispute.

The government had stopped systematically collecting data on unofficial strikes in This showed that in , out of coal strikes were unofficial, in it was out of , and in January to November out of whole year.

In motor vehicles, the equivalent figures were 80 out of , 39 out of 56, and 42 out of Therefore, in these three industry groups, most recorded strikes were unofficial. In the seven most strike-prone industry groups provided unofficial strikes out of the total official and unofficial of 1, for the whole economy.

In , it was out of ; and in , out of These buried away figures show that unofficial strikes were declining rapidly in the late s. They fell further in as coalmining strikes disappeared along with the industry table 1.

The majority of all strikes were now official. Under the Act official strikes could generally be organised through workplace ballots in less than two weeks.

The additional notification and postal ballot requirements of the Act extended this by about another three weeks. Labour market weakness would have encouraged more groups to seek union protection before action over non-perishable issues.

Whatever factors produced this result, Tory legislation cannot have been one of them. Strikes among white collar public service workers had been almost unknown apart from teachers before the s.